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INTRODUCTION
In order to understand our world today, we need to understand the
principal international economic institutions that provide the founda-
tion and structural support of the world economy. This does not mean
that the day of the nation-state is over, nor that the institutions have
become so successful that a brave new world of supranationalism is
about to dawn. Rather, it means that the creative institutional experi-
ments in international cooperation, born out of the ashes of World War
II, have become so well established that there is a tendency to take
them for granted. Having such institutions in place is a major asset for
mankind in dealing with growing economic integration and increasingly
pervasive interdependence with its inherent vulnerabilities.
To reflect on these achievements in institution-building is also to pon-
der questions about the future. This is an important subject that de-
serves much further thinking. The propositions emerging from the re-
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flections set out in this article are that: increasing cooperation among
international economic institutions, leading to coordination, is a likely
direction for the future; law has a central role to play in this process;
and some promising techniques for coordination, already tested and im-
proved by experience, have been developed and may provide the basis
for further evolution.
I. ORIGINS OF INSTITUTION
There are three principal international economic institutions of a
universal character: the International Monetary Fund (Fund),1 the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or
Bank),2 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 3
All three originated in wartime planning for a better economic future,
although the GATT was created later than the Fund and the Bank
after the charter of the planned International Trade Organization
(ITO)4 failed to enter into force. The planning took place against the
background of the impoverishing economic policies of the 1930s, and in
the context of ambitious planning that led to the establishment of the
universal political institution, the United Nations. The history of these
institutions is thus short by historical standards. The economic institu-
tions- are based on the recognition that in an interdependent world
economy national and international prosperity are inseparable.
As befitting the purposes of these institutions, they are of universal
scope, with a growing membership reflecting the common interests
among states, and hence the growth of community among them. They
represent a potent force of attraction, that has led to a diminishing
number of non-members, a shrinking category that may be expected to
disappear altogether. The universal economic institutions coexist with
international economic organizations of a regional or more limited
character that are more or less patterned after them or have overlap-
1. International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775,
T.I.A.S. No. 6748, and Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, reprinted in
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND (1985) [hereinafter FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT].
2. Articles of Agreement for the International Bank For Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended,
Aug. 25, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929 [hereinafter Articles of Agreement
for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development].
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (as amended 1969) [herein-
after GATT].
4. Havana Charter of 1948, opened for signature Mar. 24, 1948, E/Conf.2/78,
U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/4 (1948).
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ping or related functions, such as the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD),' the European Communities (EC),'
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),J the regional develop-
ment banks, and in the distinct orbit around the Soviet Union, the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).8
The three principal institutions, the Fund, the World Bank, and the
GATT, thus started out sharing the broad unity of purpose of promot-
ing national and international prosperity. They were to do so with a
historical division of work among them: the Fund was to promote a
stable and open international monetary system, the World Bank eco-
nomic growth through post-war reconstruction and development
through productive investment, while the GATT would provide the
framework for the establishment of an open international trading sys-
tem. With the pursuit of prosperity being thus attended to, peace would
be achieved through political cooperation institutionalized in the
United Nations.
The postwar reality was not kind to the grand design. In retrospect it
is easy to see the unforeseen conflicts, the design flaws, and the imper-
fections of implementation, even if the issues involved in these judg-
ments are still controversial. It would be mistaken, however, to discount
the existing imperfect reality too harshly against the ultimate goals,
because the future of these institutions, and what can be made of them,
is still ahead of us. Their evolution to date illuminates the path ahead.
II. BASIC FUNCTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING
ARRANGEMENTS
A. THE FUND
The Fund can be regarded as the centerpiece of the international
monetary system. As an interesting paradox of imperfect understanding
at the creation, the very notion that there is such a thing as an interna-
tional monetary system did not develop until almost two decades after
the establishment of the Fund.' By now, following the Second Amend-
5. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), opened for
signature Sept. 30, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S. 179.
6. European Communities (EC), opened for signature Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 4 E.Y.B. 412, U.K.T.S. 15 (1979), CMND 7480, J.O.F. Feb. 2, 1958; 1958
R.T.A.F. 5, 12 Vest. A. 134.
7. Bank for International Settlement (BIS), Jan. 20, 1938, 104 L.T.S. 441.
8. Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Apr. 13, 1968, 368 U.N.TS.
5245.
9. International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 1289-(62/1) (1962), as amended,
International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 7337 (83/37), reprinted in INTErtNA-
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ment of the Fund's Articles of Agreement in 1978,10 the concept had
become a basic one in the Fund, even though its full implications re-
main to be drawn. The Fund's Articles of Agreement constitute an ele-
ment of the constitution of this system, and hence of international eco-
nomic law. It is important to note, lest the evolution of the Fund's
activities in the past decade toward the financial problems of economic
development detract attention from its basic mission, the Fund's func-
tions are not limited to developing states.
In fact, the Fund represents a unique combination of consultative,
regulatory, financial, and technical assistance functions at the inter-
governmental level for both industrial and developing countries. As ap-
propriate for the performance of these functions, the Fund has devel-
oped a unique technical machinery: policy conditionality regarding bal-
ance of payments adjustment and its financing;11 stand-by and similar
arrangements, 2 the exchange of currency as the legal basis for making
loans in the economic sense,' 3 maintenance of value in terms of the
special drawing right (SDR), and SDR allocation as an international
fiduciary issue to supplement global official liquidity. 4 As appropriate
for a financial institution, the Fund is self-financing for administrative
expenditures, in the sense that it does not depend on annual contribu-
tions or levies on its membership (as the United Nations); and as ap-
propriate to an independent inter-governmental institution, it has the
power of self-interpretation of its constituent instrument. The combina-
tion of these two attributes provides important institutional support for
operational independence.
Institutional adaptations throughout the Fund's history have oc-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 157-71 (13th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SELECTED DE-
CISIONS OF THE IMF]; see 2 J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 22-28 (1984) [hereinafter J.
GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS] (describing the evolution of the notion of an international
monetary system as a legal concept).
10. See FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. IV, §§ 1, 2(b), 2(c), 3,
4 (1985) (recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is
to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital
among countries, and that each member must collaborate with the Fund and other
members to promote a stable system of exchange rates); id. art. VIII, § 7 (stating
obligations to collaborate regarding policies on reserve assets); id. sched. D, para. 2(a)
(describing the role of the Council, if established, to supervise the management and
adaptation of the international monetary system).
I1. See J. GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 435-43 (describing the poli-
cies and facilities under which the Fund provides financial assistance).
12. Id.
13. Id. art. V, § 3(b).
14. Id. art. XV-XXV.
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curred through amendments of the Fund's Articles of Agreement or
the development of facilities within the framework of the Articles.
Thus, the SDR system was established by the First Amendment in
1969, while the replacement of the par value system based on gold with
the present freedom of exchange arrangements, subject to a code of
behavior under the Fund's surveillance, and the demonetization of gold
in the Fund occurred under the Second Amendment in 1978.1' The
establishment of the Trust Fund in 1976 and the successor Structural
Adjustment Facility in 1986 with the proceeds of profits from sales of
gold held by the Fund illustrate this process by showing the internaliza-
tion of developing function, while the establishment of financial facili-
ties show the versatility of the Fund's legal machinery in support of
policy-based lending.16
Decision-making arrangements in the Fund give significant weight to
the principle of seeking to approximate the economic importance of
countries outside the institution with their voting power within the in-
stitution, in order to have the institution take decisions on matters
within the scope of its functions.1 " A weighted voting system is thus the
foundation of decision-making. Quotas assigned to members are the ba-
sis not only for decision-making, but also for access to resources, fi-
nancing other than through borrowing, and SDR allocations and ac-
ceptance obligations. The decision-making system based on quotas is
modified to a limited extent, however, by the existence of basic votes
that reflect the competing doctrine of equality of states in international
law." The system for determining quotas available to members is de-
cided by the Fund, and it currently takes into account the members'
GDP, average reserves, current payments, current receipts and varia-
bility of current receipts.
The decision-making system is not as simple, however, as its founda-
tion in weighted votes may suggest. Most decisions at Fund meetings
are taken by ascertaining the sense of the meeting rather than through
actual voting. 9 This procedure promotes consensus while taking into
account the members' underlying voting power. In order to protect the
15. See J. GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 754-63 (explaining how the
Second Amendment has contributed to a gradual decline in the role of gold in the
international monetary system).
16. Id. at 435-43.
17. See F. LISTER, 20 DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIzATIONs: THE IMF MODE 37-42 (Monograph series in World Affairs, book 4, 1984)
(analyzing the principle of weighted voting).
18. See FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. XII, § 5.
19. See J. GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 403-07 (discussing the relative
voting power of the individual member countries and the various classes of members).
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interests of the minority, and of particular members where certain of
their specific interests are at stake, various techniques have been super-
imposed on the weighted voting: special majorities, enabling powers,
powers to vary, decisions subject to opting out (SDR allocations), or
the concurrence of the member affected.2 0 Apart from the decision-
making procedure as such, further safeguards are provided by adher-
ence to the highly developed principle of uniformity for policy decisions
which requires the uniform treatment of members to which the policy
applies, as distinguished from decisions in particular cases. In sum, the
Fund's legal structure represents a flexible framework of constitutional
rules, subject to safeguards, but with policy and operational discretion
lodged in the institution to permit evolution both through rule-making
and improvisational case-by-case decision-making. Discretion is partic-
ularly important in periods of rapid changes in the international econ-
omy with the attendant problems of adjustment and financing, such as
the debt problem since 1982.
The organs of the Fund through which decisions are taken are: the
Board of Governors at the ministerial level, an Executive Board in con-
tinuous session in which Executive Directors cast all the votes each is
entitled to cast as a unit, and the Managing Director and the staff. In
addition, and even though not organs in the sense of having no voting
and no power to take decisions, two ministerial level committees, the
Interim Committee and the Development Committee, which are joint
committees of the Boards of Governors of the Fund and the Bank,
round out the structure. Reference also needs to be made to groupings
of members for formulating common positions: G-5, G-7, G-10, and G-
24,21 in order to see the workings of this machinery in a broader
context.
B. THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank is the central institution for the promotion of eco-
nomic development. It is the leading source of lending for productive
investment to countries that have not reached the stage of economic
development at which they are able to generate sufficient domestic sav-
ings for investment or obtain needed external financing on commercial
20. FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. V, § 6(c).
21. G-5 consists of: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, and Japan. G-7 includes these countries plus Canada and Italy.
G-10 includes the first seven countries plus Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. G-
24 was established by developing countries and consists of eight representatives each of
the African, Asian, and Latin American member countries, but any member of the
Group of 77 (UNCTAD) may participate in all of its meetings and deliberations.
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terms.2 Its mission is thus, different from the Fund's, being both
broader and narrower at the same time. It is broader in that economic
development is an open-ended task, unlike the balance of payments ad-
justment that addresses temporary disturbances in the country's eco-
nomic relations with the rest of the world. It is narrower in that once
countries are able to generate savings or attract capital inflows without
the need for the Bank's assistance, they "graduate," that is, cease to
qualify for Bank lending. Although on graduation the Bank thus
achieves its purpose to assist in the economic development of these
countries, the countries may experience occasional balance of payments
problems that may lead them to request the Fund's assistance.
The Bank is the central institution for development finance, not only
as a matter of relative size, but also because it is the model for other
multilateral development banks in charter, functions, policies, and pro-
cedures. It is a highly efficient institution for financial intermediation
because, unlike the Fund, which obtains its financing from official
sources, thus far, the Bank's financial structure is substantially one of
market-financing. The Bank thus finances itself through borrowing in
the international capital markets against the backing of the official
credit by members in the form of subscribed, but uncalled capital. By
lending what it borrows, investing for liquidity, and earning what it
spends on administration, the financing cost to the Bank's membership
is minimal, because the machinery is self-sustaining as long as the
Bank succeeds in its task, and thus the official backing that stands be-
hind the Bank need not be called.
Decision-making arrangements in the Bank are similar in broad out-
line to those of the Fund, reflecting common parentage and member-
ship, but there are differences of procedure and practice. These differ-
ences are due to the Bank's institutional culture of project orientation,
which was until recently the norm in its operations, and market financ-
ing relative to the Fund's culture of policy-based lending and official
financing. There are similar supports for operational independence
through self-financing for administrative expenditures, and self-inter-
pretation of the constituent instrument.23 Interestingly enough, how-
ever, institutional adaptations for the Bank have taken place for the
most part through the establishment of juridically separate entities as
affiliates, "members of the World Bank Group," rather than by the
22. E. MASON & R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETON WOODS 18 (1973)
[hereinafter MASON].
23. An effective limitation on self-interpretation is relations with non-members,
which are far more extensive for the Bank than for the Fund because of the financial
structure of the Bank.
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establishment of financial facilities within the institution itself, as in the
case of the Fund. This process can be seen to some extent to reflect, on
one hand, the interplay between market-based and official financing for
development, with the desire to separate the two juridically and sym-
bolically, and on the other hand, the desire to limit the financial risk of
new functions for the Bank itself. Thus, the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC)24 was established in 1956 to assist the economic devel-
opment of developing countries by promoting growth in the private sec-
tor of their economies, and helping to mobilize domestic and foreign
capital for this purpose where sufficient private capital is unavailable
without government guarantee and on reasonable terms; the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) in 196028 with subscribed offi-
cial resources of richer countries to lend to the poorest member coun-
tries on concessional terms; the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)2 1 in 1966 to promote foreign invest-
ment through facilitating settlement of investment disputes between
states and foreign investors; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA), 27 established in 1988, to encourage foreign invest-
ment by promoting a favorable environment for it, and providing guar-
antees against certain noncommercial risks, such as the transfer risk,
repudiation, armed conflict, and civil unrest.
C. THE GATT
Although the GATT originated in the same context and period as
the Fund and the Bank, its beginnings already foreshadowed difficulties
ahead. The initial planning to establish an International TTade Organi-
zation (ITO) to implement the comprehensive provisions on commer-
cial policies of the Havana Charter of 1948 did not succeed. 28 Al-
though the ITO did not thus come into existence, some of the
24. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), opened
for signature Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117,
amended Sept. 1, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2945, T.I.A.S. No. 4894, 439 U.N.T.S. 318,
amended Aug. 25, 1963, 24 U.S.T. 1760, T.I.A.S. No. 7683.
25. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association (IDA),
opened for signature Aug. 9, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S.
249.
26. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 557 U.N.T.S. 159.
27. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L.J. 147
(1986).
28. See supra note 4 (citing the Havana Charter, the document establishing the
ITO).
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provisions of the Havana Charter were agreed in 1947 during separate
multilateral tariff negotiations to be implemented on a provisional basis
in advance as the GATT, and as it turned out since then. As a result,
the GATT, strictly speaking, is a general international agreement, but
not an international organization like the Fund or Bank. Accordingly,
it is called an international economic institution in this Article in a
broad sense only, more as a framework for negotiations among "the
Contracting Parties" than an organization that has "members" as the
Fund and the Bank. It embodies a combination of a code of conduct on
trade policies with schedules of tariff concessions, built on the principle
of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, but given effect
through bilateral reciprocity as a system of enforcement.
Although both the Fund and the Bank have their critics, there is
close unanimity of opinion about the GATT. The opinion is that, while
the functions of the GATT are important, and much has been achieved
in the reduction of tariffs among industrialized countries, the GATT is
in disarray and basic reforms are desirable. These reforms are now the
subject of negotiations, the "eighth" round, over a four-year period that
started with the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations on September 25, 1986.29
What went wrong? Comparison with the Fund's regulatory jurisdic-
tion over exchange restrictions, of which trade restrictions can be re-
garded as counterparts, is instructive. ° A strong contrast emerges be-
tween the two central concepts of non-discrimination: the Fund's
through the observance of international obligations by all members to
an international organization with regulatory powers and financial Iev-
29. See THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS 1-3 (J.M. Finger & A. Olechowski eds. 1987) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY
ROUND] (covering specific aspects of GATT negotiations in the Uruguay Round); Pat-
terson & Patterson, Objectives of the Uruguay Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra, at 8 (stating that the objectives of the Uruguay Round are to bring about fur-
ther liberalization and expansion of world trade in goods and services). Objectives in-
clude the improvement of access to markets through the reduction and elimination of
tariffs, quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers. Id. These goals are to
strengthen the role of GATT and bring about wider coverage of world trade under
agreed principles, and to improve international cooperation involving trade and other
economic policies affecting growth and development. Id. at 7-8. See also id. at 7 (find-
ing it indisputable that many Contracting Parties violate existing rules, Contracting
Parties often circumvent the system, and the rules do not cover large and growing
sectors of international trade); Kelly, Functioning of the GATT System, in THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, supra, at 82 (estimating that approximately half of the trade in the
world is preferential, and does not follow the general principle of non-discrimination
that GATT supports).
30. Silard, The Impact of the International Monetary Fund on International
Trade, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 121, 134-40 (1968).
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erage in support of its purposes, and the GATT's through the contrac-
tual multilateralization of negotiated concessions among countries
whose approach both to negotiations and to multilateralization may be
substantially different from one another, not even to speak of the lack
of financial leverage. The contrast is sharpened by differences in deci-
sion making: the Fund's centrally multilateral model is far different
from the requirement of unanimity for major GATT decisions by all
the Contracting Parties,31 as is the process of negotiation on policies in
the Fund with the uniform treatment of those to whom the policies
apply when compared with the bargaining of concessions in the GATT
on specific commodities or categories.
In the Uruguay Round, then, a number of these problems will be
addressed, including reform of the GATT machinery itself. It will be
desirable to come to grips both with the limited coverage of the GATT,
that is non-coverage of trade in services and agriculture, and a self-
defeating system of snowballing preferences, in which negotiated tariff
preferences, mostly for the benefit of developing countries, but also for
customs unions and free trade areas involving industrial countries,32 are
defeated through non-tariff barriers,33 which then became the subject
of negotiations leading to the establishment of codes to deal with them
in the 1974-1979 Tokyo Round.34 The codes, in turn, lack full support
and adequate dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms.
The absence of a full-fledged parallel to the Fund in the trade field
has thus created an effective vacuum in many areas of commercial pol-
icy. As having such a vacuum is inconsistent with the purposes of the
other two principal international economic institutions and the assump-
tion on which their functions rest, it is being filled to some extent by
them, as discussed below.
31. It is revealing that the GATT Secretariat has no authority to initiate action on
infractions of the rules of the GATT, but acts only on complaints.
32. See Hindley: Different and More Favorable Treatment - and Graduation, in
THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 29, at 67-74 (stating existing preferences under
GATT). In particular, preferences exists under GATT article XVIII, Part IV of the
GATT (with specific reference to article XXXVI (8)), article XXIV, the Generalized
System of Preferences, and exemptions in the non-tariff trade barrier codes.
33. Infra note 34. The "favorite" non-tariff barriers are "orderly marketing ar-
rangements," and "voluntary export restrictions."
34. See Baldwin, Multilateral Liberalization, in THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 29, at 43 (finding that codes are legally imperfect substitutes for amending the
GATT, which was considered not feasible). The coverage of the codes includes subsi-
dies, countervailing duties, antidumping measures, government procurement policies,
technical barriers to trade, customs valuation practices, and import licensing proce-
dures. Id.; see also Stern & Hoekman, The Codes Approach, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 29, at 65-66.
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III. LINKAGES AMONG INSTITUTIONS
The formal, operational, and evolving relationships among the insti-
tutions are broadly based on the recognition that each institution can
promote its purposes effectively only if the purposes of the other institu-
tions are also promoted in a mutually reinforcing way. This recognition
is reflected not only in the organic relationships among them that were
established at the outset, but also in operational relationships that give
substance to reaffirmations of close cooperation and procedures based
on them. Indeed, what is striking about these relationships is how insti-
tutions have taken the lead in assuming functions that they considered
necessary in order to fulfill their own purposes, even in certain circum-
stances in which the functions arguably belonged to another institution,
but the other institution did not effectively fill its own area. Three ex-
amples are revealing: the initial interpretation of its Articles of Agree-
ment by the World Bank, which clarified its authority to lend for bal-
ance of payment stabilization;36 conditionality relating to trade policy
by both the Bank and the Fund; and structural adjustment lending by
the Bank and more recently by the Fund in order to promote policies
for economic development. Efforts to deal with the debt problem both
by the Bank and the Fund illustrate a further relationship: a challenge
to both institutions to come to grips with a problem that did not seem
to fall clearly within the purposes of any economic institution, but
which creates a serious obstacle to the performance of the functions of
both of them. These considerations lead to the topic of coordination
among the institutions, the desirability for which has evolved from the
need both to reinforce their effectiveness and to enable them to deal
with common problems.
A. ORGANIC LINKAGES
Membership in the Fund is the basic principle, based on the central
importance of a cooperative and stable monetary order for international
economic relations. The closest relationship amongst the institutions is
between the Fund and the World Bank36 in that membership in the
Bank is available only to Fund members. The relationship with the
35. MASON, supra note 22, at 25. The Bank's interpretation was that it had "au-
thority to make or guarantee loans for programs of economic reconstruction and the
reconstruction of monetary systems, including long term stabilization loans." Based on
this interpretation, the Bank made its early program loans to France, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Luxembourg. Id.
36. See J. GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 453-77 (studying the relation-
ship between the Fund and the Bank).
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GATT is again centered on the Fund, although somewhat less tightly:
contracting parties to the GATT must be either Fund members or must
make arrangements with the GATT based on principles of the Fund's
code of conduct with respect to exchange policies. In addition, the
GATT is required to give conclusive effect to the Fund's findings of
facts and determinations as to what constitutes a serious decline in a
country's monetary reserves or very low or inadequate monetary
reserves, that are justification subject to the GATT's decision for the
introduction or maintenance of quantitative restrictions to safeguard
the member's balance of payments. 7
B. OPERATIONAL LINKAGES
Sound macroeconomic policies include appropriate policies for bal-
ance of payments adjustment and financing. These policies in many
cases must promote economic growth in order to succeed. In turn, the
formulation of development and investment policies, and the implemen-
tation of microeconomic policies and investment projects require a sup-
portive environment of sound macroeconomic policies. Prospects for
trade liberalization may depend on an appropriate balance of payments
adjustment and investment policies and without externally oriented
trade policies the economy may not grow in a satisfactory way.
The economic policies promoted by the institutions are complemen-
tary, and this creates the operational matrix for their activities.38 In
addition to linkages among the institutions themselves, each institution
brings to the process its own relationships with other entities, the most
notable of which are those between the Fund and Paris Club official
creditors, the Bank and development donors, and between both the
Fund and the Bank and commercial banks. The resulting interactions
have created a technically and legally complex web of economic and
financial relations, built on the central importance of promoting and
supporting sound national economic policies and economic develop-
ment. An illustration of these relationships is the 1985 Baker initiative
to help deal with debt problems by calling on all these parties to join
forces and by promoting a program for sustained growth. These rela-
tionships can be best understood when seen from different perspectives.
37. See id. at 454 (discussing safeguards which prohibit Contracting Parties from
frustrating the intent of the provisions of the Fund's Articles of Agreement).
38. See Silard, supra note 30, at 136 (discussing cooperation between the Fund and
GATT).
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1. The Fund's Perspective
From the Fund's perspective, policies for balance of payments ad-
justment are comprehensive, covering both domestic and external poli-
cies. The reasons for this include the fact that both domestic and exter-
nal policies affect international transactions, and reflect the scope of
the balance of payments as the account of all the international transac-
tions of a country. This perspective is reflected in the general obliga-
tions of Fund members regarding exchange arrangements under article
IV of the Fund's Articles of Agreement."
They are also reflected in article I, paragraph (v), 40 of the Fund's
Articles of Agreement, dealing with the Fund's purposes, which is
based on the recognition that there can be various ways of correcting
maladjustments in a country's balance of payments, but some of the
methods, such as exchange restrictions, may be destructive of national
or international prosperity, and hence their avoidance justifies the ex-
tension of international official financial support.
These principles are fundamental to an understanding of how the
Fund has developed its financial policies. The Fund is a complex finan-
39. FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. IV. Article IV, section I
provides that:
General obligations of members
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to
provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital
among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal
objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that
are necessary for financial and economic stability, each member undertakes to
collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange ar-
rangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each
member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective
of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due
regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and
financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic
disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this
Section.
Id.
40. Id. art. I. Article I (v) provides that one of the purposes of the Fund is:
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing
them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosper-
ity. (emphasis supplied).
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
cial institution, serving the needs of its members in several ways. The
financial policies and arrangements discussed here do not exhaust the
Fund's financial techniques, which can be illustrated in a simplified
way as follows:
Fund
Special Drawing Rights
General Department Department
General Special
Resources Disbursement Investment
Account Account Account
tranche Structural Allocation of SDRs
policy Adjustment
Facility Operations and
-reserve (structural transactions in SDRs
tranche adjustment
arrangements)
-first
credit
tranche*
-upper
credit
tranches*
-emergency
policy
Extended Fund
Facility*
Compensatory
Financing
Facility
(including
Cereal Imports
Facility)
Buffer Stock
Financing
Facility
In addition,
administered
accounts of
trust resources
* Stand-by arrangements are used to make available resources in the first
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The principles deriving from the Fund's purposes help clarify both
the scope of policies that are typically covered by the economic pro-
grams of members supported by the Fund's resources through stand-by
and extended arrangements, and how these arrangements have become
the basic and most effective financial technique of the Fund.' 1 The
scope of policies can be seen through performance criteria that nor-
mally include a limit on domestic credit, with sub-limit on public sector
credit; external borrowing, and exchange rate and exchange system pol-
icies, including the elimination of payments arrears where these exist.
Other policies may include interest rate policies, tax measures to raise
revenue, reductions in governmental expenditures, elimination of subsi-
dies, and improvements in the financial performance of parastatal
enterprises.
A similarly comprehensive technique for policy support is a variant
of these arrangements, the structural adjustment arrangement, that
provides resources to low-income developing members on concessional
terms under the Fund's Structural Adjustment Facility.' 2 Under these
arrangements, benchmarks or indicators, rather than performance cri-
teria, are used to reflect "first credit tranche" conditionality. An inter-
esting feature of this arrangement is the Policy Framework Paper, dis-
cussed below, which extends in a novel and experimental way, but by a
long step, the comprehensiveness of the policies to be supported beyond
the coverage of macroeconomic policies into the additional area of
structural and investment policies and their financing by the World
Bank.
2. The World Bank's Perspective
From the World Bank's perspective, the fundamental objective set
out in the Bank's purposes'3 is to encourage economic development by
and upper credit tranches, and extended arrangements under the Extended Fund Facil-
ity. The arrangements may involve the use of resources under the Enlarged Access
Policy, including the use of both ordinary and borrowed resources.
41. SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE IMF, supra note 9, at 27-29, 62-72 (explaining
the standard forms of these arrangements, together with the Fund's guidelines on
conditionality).
42. See id. at 142-54 (reprinting the Regulations and the Managing Directors'
summary of the Executive Board discussion on the establishment of this facility). For
materials relating to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, see 1988 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 119-33.
43. Articles of Agreement for the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, supra note 2, art. I. Article I of the Bank's Articles of Agreement provides:
Article I
PURPOSES
The purposes of the Bank are:
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facilitating investment for productive purposes. Until 1980, the Bank's
emphasis in pursuing this goal through its financial activities has been
on project lending, which continues to account for the bulk of the
Bank's activities. Lending for projects can prosper, however, only if
there are sound projects with a promising rate of return and assurances
for repayment, and the projects can succeed. The entire project lending
process requires a supportive policy environment. This leads to the
broadening of interest from the projects to the economic sectors in
which the projects fit, and the sectoral environment and policies, such
as the pricing policies for public utilities and agriculture. The sectoral
interest then broadens to interest in structural reforms that may be
necessary to achieve the desirable policy environment for both specific
projects and the relevant sectors of the economy. Based on these con-
siderations, the World Bank has at present five loan categories:
(a) specific investment loans for projects;
(b) sector loans addressing such policies as input/output prices and lending rates
for the sector being assisted;
(c) structural adjustment loans, since 1980, to deal with macroeconomic policy
programs and institutional changes necessary to modify the structure of the
economy so that the economy can achieve and maintain an appropriate growth
rate and the viability of its balance of payments in the medium term with em-
phasis on sectors in which adjustment is considered to be most urgent;
(d) technical assistance loans for institution building and support; and
(e) emergency reconstruction loans.
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the resto-
ration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive
facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of pro-
ductive facilities and resources in less developed countries.
(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participa-
tion in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private
capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by
providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own
capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.
(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging interna-
tional investment for the development of the productive resources of members,
thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of
labor in their territories.
(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international
loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large
and small alike, will be dealt with first.
(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international in-
vestment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immedi-
ate postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from wartime
to a peacetime economy.
The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purpose set forth above.
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Of these lending categories, the structural and sectoral adjustment
lending best enables the Bank to address basic issues of economic man-
agement. Such lending mobilizes domestic resources through a variety
of policies. These include fiscal, monetary, and credit policies (such as
revenue-raising and expenditure-limiting measures, limitation of exter-
nal borrowing, and decontrol of interest rates); improvement in the reg-
ulatory environment and the efficiency of resource allocation and use
by the public sector (including divestiture, where appropriate, of public
holdings, and the allocation of resources as between investment and
current outlays); and reform of the structure of incentives to promote
efficient resource allocation (such as trade reform to reduce bias
against exports, rationalized level of protection and price reforms to
align incentives in such areas as agriculture, production distribution,
energy, and state enterprise pricing). Thus, it is the Bank's need to
promote a sound macroeconomic environment and appropriate develop-
ment policies that have led to the growth of operational relations with
the other economic institutions which have dealt with these policies as
part of their functions.
3. The GATT's Perspective
From the GATT's perspective, interactions among the three institu-
tions take various forms. Apart from the Fund's findings and determi-
nations mentioned earlier, the Fund and the GATT have developed ar-
rangements for cooperation. In addition, the Fund's consultative and
financial activities are not limited to its regulatory jurisdiction. Thus,
the Fund consults regularly with its members on their general economic
policies under article IV of the Fund Agreement. The consultations
cover trade policies, and the Fund gives advice on these policies. Trade
policies are also covered in the members' economic programs supported
by Fund resources, normally, both from the perspective of
macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies and the understand-
ing that restrictive policies in the payments and trade areas are close
substitutes for one another. This last perspective is captured in the
principle, in article XV (4) of the GATT, to the effect that:
Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the pro-
visions of this Agreement, nor by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund."'
Trade policy is also an important aspect of the structural and
sectoral adjustment policies supported by the World Bank.
44. GATT, supra note 3, art. XV (4).
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As the growing disarray in the GATT has led to an effective vacuum
in the legal system governing international commercial policies, an in-
teresting paradox has developed for developing countries. They have
obtained different and more favorable treatment under the GATT, with
the result that they have very few effective obligations, but still have
considerable rights under the GATT.4" The opportunity to exercise
these rights, even to the extent that these are not counteracted or
avoided by industrial countries through protectionist measures techni-
cally or arguably outside of the GATT, has not turned out to be an
advantage, however, as a general matter. It has been learned from ex-
perience, as encapsulated in the Fund's purposes by reference to the
desirability of correcting maladjustments in the balance of payments
"without resorting to measures destructive of national or international
prosperity,"46 that restrictions are harmful not only for those against
whom they are imposed, but for the country imposing them as well.
Because restrictive trade practices are harmful to developing countries
as obstacles to balance of payments adjustments and economic growth,
both the Fund and the Bank assist these countries to avoid or reduce
recourse to them, without reference to the privileged status of such re-
strictions under the GATT, or the bargaining situation under the
GATT built on reciprocity. Reflection on this paradox, and on the fill-
ing by the Fund and the Bank of the policy vacuum created under the
GATT, suggest that the Fund and the Bank, in order to fulfill their
institutional purposes, promote the participation of developing countries
in the world economy in a different way from the approach based on
the GATT's organizing principle of reciprocity that has led to a blind
alley both for developing countries and the international community as
a whole. The Uruguay Round offers an opportunity to reform the
GATT system, but should the reform fail to take place, or not go far
enough, the Bank and the Fund remain as institutional backstops for
the international community.
IV. COORDINATION AMONG THE INSTITUTIONS
Promotion of the purposes of the Fund, the Bank, and the GATT
lead to a need, not only for close cooperation and operational interac-
tions, but what is more, to a need for coordination. Coordination is
45. See Hindley, Different and More Favorable Treatment - and Graduation, in
THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 29, at 67-74 (stating that, in particular, preferences
exist under GATT: article XVIII; part IV, with specific reference to article XXXVI
(8); article XXIV, the Generalized System of Preferences; and exemptions in the non-
tariff trade barrier codes).
46. FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note I, art. I (v).
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desirable as a minimum to avoid conflicting policy advice, but more
affirmatively it is a search for complementarity. This is undertaken
with the desire to avoid the abdication of independent decision-making
authority by each institution, often referred to as "cross-conditional-
ity," that is an issue particularly relevant to financial institutions.
The ultimate in coordination is, of course, merger.4 This does not
seem plausible for the foreseeable future, given the historical evolution
of the institutions as independent entities, even if there is reason to
doubt that they would be established in their existing from at present.
This leads to the consideration of alternative possibilities.
A. ExISTING TECHNIQUES FOR COORDINATION
One technique that has developed is to take into account in approv-
ing World Bank loans whether a Fund stand-by or extended arrange-
ment is in effect to promote the desirable macroeconomic policy envi-
ronment for the success of Bank lending. Thus, structural adjustment
loans and most sector adjustment loans have been typically accompa-
nied by Fund arrangements that are in effect or about to be approved.
Conversely, Fund arrangements take into account the Bank's appraisal
and support for investment policies at both the policy level and in terms
of available financing for the country to assure the viability of the bal-
ance of payments adjustment policies.
A broader technique, involving not only the World Bank and the
Fund, but also official donors and creditors, and commercial banks,
arises out of the condition that the program of the member country's
program be fully financed. The condition of full financing probably has
not been seen as a technique for coordination, because the purpose is to
seek to assure the success of the country's policy program, and hence of
the lending operation supporting the program. Yet, it has that effect in
the circumstances of many countries because full financing of the pro-
gram can be achieved only if all creditors and donors are ready to
make their contributions, and this is not practically feasible without
coordination among them.
A more limited technique is illustrated by the standard provision in-
cluded in the Fund's stand-by and extended arrangements: 4 a mem-
ber's drawing rights under the arrangement are interrupted if the
member introduces or intensifies restrictions on imports for balance of
47. See J. GOLD, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 475-76 (offering a history of
early consideration and rejection of the argument for a single organization during the
drafting of the Articles of Agreement for the Fund and the Bank).
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining standard forms).
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payments reasons. This is a standstill provision, and is not designed in
itself to promote and monitor the liberalization of the import regime,
which may be the subject of other provisions in the Fund's arrange-
ments as well as in the Bank's structural adjustment and sectoral loans.
A more recently developed technique, mentioned earlier, is based on
the Fund's innovation of lending in the form of structural adjustment
arrangements under the Structural Adjustment Facility. This is the use
of a country Policy Framework Paper as a jointly prepared policy um-
brella among the national authorities and the staffs of the Fund and
the Bank, reviewed by the Executive Boards of both institutions, cover-
ing on a medium term basis both the macroeconomic framework and
the structural and investment program, at present on a rolling 3-year
basis, together with the external financial requirements and
availabilities.
B. PERSPECTIVES FOR COORDINATION: TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE
ECONOMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK?
The evolution of international economic institutions, as seen over the
nearly four decades of their existence, has been toward increasingly
comprehensive policy coverage in an environment of far-reaching
changes at an accelerating pace in the world economy. A reason for the
Fund to have taken the leading role in this process may have been that
the achievement of its purposes requires the Fund to support policies
that need to address a country's balance of payments problems through
a comprehensive set of economic policies. A similar perspective has
emerged relatively recently and gradually also from the Bank's interest
in the promotion of economic growth through structural adjustment
lending. The comprehensiveness of these approaches catalyzes national
policy coordination, in that the country seeking Fund or Bank support
needs to assemble a coherent set of policies that will be effective in
dealing with its balance of payments problem and will promote eco-
nomic development, even if responsibility for the appropriate policy ar-
eas is dispersed at the national level among various ministries and gov-
ernment agencies, and at the international level may be subject to the
jurisdiction of different international organizations.
A comprehensive approach that involved not only the Fund and the
Bank, but also other international economic institutions and interested
entities broadens the scope of this process. In principle, this would re-
sult in a better and more efficient service to developing countries, and
hold out the hope of evolution toward a medium-term comprehensive
economic policy framework as a kind of international economic policy
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compact.
What would such a comprehensive framework need to cover if it
were to provide for an appropriate medium-term policy package with
effective support for economic growth? First of all, building on the
country Policy Framework Paper approach, it would include
macroeconomic policies, including balance of payment policies, as well
as structural and investment policies of the developing country, and an
external financing plan by which these policies would be supported as
they are carried out. The framework would encompass policies to deal
with financial flows, and, more particularly in present circumstances,
financing and debt rescheduling or restructuring arrangements between
the country and official lenders (Paris Club) and commercial banks. It
would also need to include trade policies, in ways that extend beyond
the existing GATT framework, so that the country can be assured of
markets for its exports while its home market opens up and remains
open to incentives for efficiency from the outside world.
Second, the comprehensive framework would need to include an ap-
propriate measure of symmetry between developing countries subject to
the financial leverage of the international economic institutions and in-
dustrial countries not needing those resources. Multilateral surveillance
of the economic and financial policies of industrialized countries that
are relevant to the international economic environment in which the
developing countries find themselves would thus need to be brought
within the framework if it is to achieve its purpose. The relevant poli-
cies of industrial countries cover a broad spectrum, including policies
on exchange rates, interest rates, trade, capital flows, and economic as-
sistance. As these polices are not separable from the more fundamental
economic and financial policies of a country, they also need to be ad-
dressed in a comprehensive way. This is an aspect of the Fund's task of
surveillance of each member's compliance with its obligations regard-
ing exchange arrangements, that based on the general obligations of
members, set out in article IV, section 1, pertaining to their economic
and financial policies. When considering the comprehensive approach,
therefore, the Fund is, to some extent, in a special position as compared
to other international economic institutions. It is the legal duty of the
Fund to exercise surveillance over the policies of both industrialized
and developing member countries that are necessary elements, even
though insufficient in themselves, for the comprehensive approach.
Symmetry of obligations of all member countries is, thus, the basis on
which the Fund can build to promote its own purposes. Similar consid-
erations do not apply with equal force either to the Bank or to the
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GATT,49 yet the Fund's focus on exchange arrangements may be too
narrow and its policy horizon too short to serve the purposes of the
other two institutions. It may be desirable, therefore, to find ways of
structuring surveillance that would include the perspectives of all three
institutions.
The development of such an approach is a challenge for the entire
international community, as a way to achieve more coherent national
and international economic policies in an integrating world economy.
The international legal system can make an important contribution to
meeting this challenge. The techniques are already available, to some
extent, from the experience of international economic institutions, al-
though further adaptations would be needed. At the decision-making
level, the involvement of the Fund and the Bank imply the use of their
own decision-making arrangements for their own participation, with
such coordinating bodies at the political level as may be consistent with
these arrangements, such as the Interim Committee and the Develop-
ment Committee. How the GATT may fit into these arrangements re-
quires further consideration, for which the Uruguay Round is
opportune.
At the technical level, evolution has led to the development of the
country Policy Framework Paper as an instrument for coordinating the
Fund and the Bank with respect to lending to the poorest, IDA eligible,
countries. Extrapolation from this evolution would be:
(a) the generalization of the technique for lending to other countries,
including, in particular, the heavily indebted countries;
(b) the broadening of the economic policy framework to be more
comprehensive in scope, in that it would also cover the contributions of
official donors and creditors, regional development banks, trade policies
with a role for a revamped GATT and also the financing arrangements
with commercial lenders and other private sources of finance; and
(c) the inclusion of relevant industrial country policies on a multilat-
eral basis in the framework.
The underlying principles of these arrangements, however complex,
can be stated rather simply: the formulation and implementation of in-
ternationally agreed sound economic policies at the national level, in-
ternational incentives for these policies, and a coherent international
policy framework that would promote the success of these policies.
49. See The Per Jacobsson Lecture by Sylvia Ostry (Sept. 27, 1987), reprinted in
S. OSTRY, INTERDEPENDENCE: VULNERABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY 12-15 (1987) (stat-
ing that trade policy surveillance at the ministerial level was proposed to complement
the Fund's surveillance activities, with the recognition that this would call for more
effective coordination among the three institutions).
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
An interesting perspective that emerges from the reflections in this
article relates to the dynamics of the evolution of international eco-
nomic institutions. The institutions were created by statesmen, acting
not on abstract theories about international order, but on a far-sighted
response to the challenge of learning from the history of the 1930s and
World War II. The challenge today is different, in that the institutions
exist and changes can be incremental. Evolution or reform of the ex-
isting institutional machinery, rather than basic new departures, take
the form of responding to the accelerating integration of the world
economy. Coordination of the institutions is similarly a gradual process,
occurring more under pressure than by design. The pressure is exerted
by historical forces as the effects of growing economic interdependence
conflict with insufficiently coordinated economic policies. The interna-
tional economic institutions feel the pressure, perceive it as a call to
greater effectiveness, and find that effectiveness cannot be achieved
without coordination.
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